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Professor Rebecca Kysar has written an interesting and informa-
tive article on the disadvantages of temporary legislation, or legislation 
that expires by default, when compared with lasting legislation, or leg-
islation that does not expire by default.  The article aspires to move 
the underlying ideological preferences of lawmakers toward lasting 
legislation,1 and represents a needed counterweight to recent scholar-
ship that has advocated temporary legislation, or has at least viewed it 
less critically.  Professor Kysar advocates a policy presumption against 
temporary legislation and in favor of lasting legislation.2
Professor Kysar’s appeal to lawmakers is most forceful with respect 
to tax policy.  She notes that internal congressional rules are easily 




 Ph.D., European Doctorate in Law and Economics; Erasmus University Rotter-
dam School of Law (Neth.) and University of Bologna Department of Economics (It.); 
frankjames.fagan@unibo.it. 
††
Professor of Comparative and International Environmental Law, Maastricht 
University (Neth.), and Professor of Comparative Private Law and Economics, Erasmus 
University Rotterdam School of Law (Neth.); faure@frg.eur.nl. 
1
 Rebecca M. Kysar, Lasting Legislation, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 1007, 1065 (2011) (ex-
plaining that “this Article . . . seeks to change underlying congressional norms”). 
2
 Id. at 1068. 
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fully constrain lawmakers.3  Thus, any long-term budgetary advantage 
of confining tax cuts and expenditures within the budget window is 
illusory.  Moreover, Professor Kysar notes that temporary tax legisla-
tion often produces post-expiration effects that are socially costly,4 and 
that temporary tax legislation may lead to higher levels of rent-
seeking.5  All of this leads her toward a conclusion that benevolent 
legislators interested in minimizing social cost should prefer lasting 
tax legislation to temporary tax legislation.6
She likewise concludes that the social cost of temporary legislation 
in policy domains other than taxation is likely to be greater than the 
social cost of lasting legislation, and that legislators should therefore 
presume to legislate permanently across the board.
 
7
The analysis that leads to this conclusion details how the law and 
economics literature on temporary legislation has understated its costs 
and overstated its benefits.  Lasting Legislation is heavy on criticism of 
temporary legislation, but perhaps given the scholarly optimism in fa-
vor of temporary legislation, this criticism may be partly characterized 
as pushback.  Elsewhere, Fagan has shared some of Professor Kysar’s 
views on temporary tax legislation,
 
8 and our Response accordingly 
focuses on her critique of the “information-producing” and “flexibil-
ity” functions of temporary legislation found in Parts III and IV of 
Lasting Legislation.9
The legislative universe is vast and cannot efficiently conform to a 




 See id. at 1024-25 (noting that legislators interpret or circumvent budget rules in 
order to satisfy “the political appetite for government spending and tax cuts”). 
4
 See id. at 1039 (noting that the costs of temporary tax cuts can extend beyond 
the budget window because cuts can change taxpayer behavior that occurs after the 
statute’s sunset date).  For a comparison of the social welfare implications of post-
expiration effects for both temporary and lasting legislation, see Frank Fagan, After the 
Sunset:  The Residual Effect of Temporary Legislation, 33 EUR. J.L. & ECON. (forthcoming 
2012) (manuscript at 12-15), available at http://www.springerlink.com/content/ 
d153517753681100/fulltext.pdf. 
5
 Kysar, supra note 1, at 1051 (“[T]emporary legislation, through continual 
threats of expiration, allows congressional members to extract more rents from inter-
est groups than does lasting legislation.”). 
6 Id. at 1068. 
7  Id. at 1066-67 (advocating a stronger presumption against tax cuts, and a weaker 
presumption for emergencies and experimental situations). 
8
 See Frank Fagan, Temporary Versus Permanent Legislation 158-73 (June 9, 
2011) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, European Doctorate in Law and Economics, 
Erasmus University Rotterdam School of Law, University of Bologna Department of 
Economics) (on file with authors). 
9
 See generally Kysar, supra note 1, at 1041-65. 
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timing of a legal intervention impacts social welfare according to pre-
vailing political conditions, and those conditions are not uniform 
across time and policy domains.10
Temporary legislation is likely to maximize social welfare when 
the legislature is addressing new risks,
  By drawing upon the theoretical 
ambiguities that arise when evaluating temporary versus permanent 
legislation outside of a well-defined policy context, our Response rea-
sons that any presumption in favor of one timing rule over the other 
deserves a more nuanced and less broad application than the blanket 
presumption presented in Lasting Legislation. 
11 when a change in social norms 
is causing compliance to increase,12 when interest groups are conceal-
ing important information from lawmakers,13 when a regulated tech-
nology is undergoing rapid transformation,14 and in other scenarios 
that the literature has yet to develop.  Lasting legislation is likely to 
maximize social welfare when social norms are not changing, when a 
policy domain is transparent, when technological advance is slow, and 
in other scenarios—also undeveloped.  Some of the underlying as-
sumptions that favor either temporary or lasting legislation can be 
readily questioned, however, and timing-rule policy recommendations 
will benefit greatly from empirical support.15
 
10
 See Fagan, supra note 
  Before addressing this 
point further, we first emphasize the importance of normatively eva-
luating temporary versus lasting legislation from the broader criterion 
of wealth maximization, or some other form of joint-welfare maximi-
4 (manuscript at 2) (noting that, in addition to an uncer-
tain legal environment given exogenously, the optimal choice of a timing rule can de-
pend upon how the initial enactment itself impacts the longer-term legal environ-
ment); see also Jacob E. Gersen & Eric A. Posner, Timing Rules and Legal Institutions, 121 
HARV. L. REV. 543, 558-61 (2007) (noting that the optimal timing of legislation de-
pends on political conditions and that the timing of a legal intervention can be as im-
portant as its content); Barbara Luppi & Francesco Parisi, Optimal Timing of Legal Inter-
ventions:  The Role of Timing Rules, 122 HARV. L. REV. F. 18, 18-20 (2009), http:// 
www.harvardlawreview.org/media/pdf/luppi_parisi.pdf (same); Francesco Parisi, Vin-
cy Fon & Nita Ghei, The Value of Waiting in Lawmaking, 18 EUR. J.L. & ECON. 131, 136-
41 (2004) (noting that lawmakers cannot know ahead of time which type of law will be 
most appropriate in various regulatory domains). 
11
 Jacob E. Gersen, Temporary Legislation, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 247, 269-71 (2007). 
12
 Fagan, supra note 4 (manuscript at 13-14). 
13
 See infra text accompanying notes 16. 
14
 BETTER REGULATION TASK FORCE, ANNUAL REPORT 2000-2001, at 19 (2001) (U.K.). 
15
 Cf. Gersen, supra note 11, at 266 (explaining that a theoretical comparison of the 
aggregate transactions costs of temporary and permanent legislation is “painfully detailed 
and frustratingly sparse on clear normative implications”); Gersen & Posner, supra note 
10, at 589 (“The proper use of timing rules depends on context, and so one cannot at a 
high level of abstraction say whether the current system is optimal or not.”). 
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zation.  Lasting Legislation appears to advance a normative position 
that favors the demand side of the legislation market, that is, the pub-
lic and interest groups.  We instead should consider the joint welfare of 
all of the stakeholders who are involved in the selection of a timing rule. 
I.  THE IMPORTANCE OF EMPLOYING A BROAD NORMATIVE CRITERION 
Four players are involved in the timing-rule game:  lawmakers, 
lobbyists, interest groups, and the public.  Each has a wide range of 
interests.  Following Lasting Legislation, we want to focus on the law-
maker’s rents, the lobbyist’s fees, the interest group’s legislation, and 
the public’s information.16
Lasting Legislation generally argues that the first scenario is more 
socially costly than the second.  To do so, it implicitly views rents and 
fees as social costs, and would find that one rent and one fee is better 
than two rents and two fees.  The first issue with this argument is that 
it sidesteps the reasonable view that the magnitude of rents and fees 
for five years of legislation is less than the magnitude of rents and fees 
for ten years of legislation.  Under the assumptions of microeconomic 
theory, though somewhat rigid, the rents and fees would be the same.  
That is, 5 x 2 would equal 10 x 1.  Lasting Legislation rightly points to 
the rigidity of the assumptions one must make to arrive at this conclu-
sion.  Nonetheless, while the individual rents and fees for two pieces 
of temporary legislation may not equate to the rents and fees for one 
piece of lasting legislation, they certainly are less.  Professor Kysar her-
self acknowledges, “To be sure, it seems reasonable to conclude that 
interest groups will value temporary legislation less than lasting legis-
lation due to its shorter duration.”
  We can compare two legislative scenarios:  
two pieces of five-year temporary legislation and a single piece of ten-
year lasting legislation.  In the first scenario, the lawmaker receives 
two rents, the lobbyist receives two fees, the interest group receives ten 
years of legislation, and the public receives a potential piece of infor-
mation at sunset review.  In the second scenario, the lawmaker rece-
ives one rent, the lobbyist receives one fee, the interest group receives 





 Though the public may be thought of as an interest group, following Kysar, su-
pra note 
  Indeed, if interest groups are 
1, at 1045, we treat it separately in order to consider joint welfare under the 
assumption that the public and an interest group are faced with divergent interests.  
For an explanation of group terminology, see MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COL-
LECTIVE ACTION 7 (2d prtg. 1971). 
17
 Kysar, supra note 1, at 1052-53. 
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paying for legislation in rents and fees, then they will pay less of them 
for legislation of less value. 
But what of a piece of five-year legislation that is extended twenty 
times?  Are the rents and fees substantially greater, or is 5 x 20 equal 
to 100 x 1?  More interestingly, what exactly is the difference in rents 
and fees, how do we measure the contributing factors to that differ-
ence, and what are the policy implications thereof?  The underlying 
assumptions that lead to opposing conclusions on the difference can 
be battered back and forth, and the question should begin to settle 
with the arrival of empirical research.  Our immediate contention 
therefore sidesteps this playing court. 
We begin with the assumption that the value that an interest 
group assigns to any piece of legislation, irrespective of how long it 
lasts, is at least equal to or greater than the interest group’s outlay of 
rents and fees.  Otherwise, if the outlay of rents and fees is greater 
than the value assigned to the legislation, the interest group will not 
expend its resources on rents and fees.  This means that whether the 
interest group expends its resources on a five-year piece of legislation 
twenty times, or on a hundred-year piece of legislation once, it will 
nevertheless experience a net gain—at each enactment and at each 
extension.  Otherwise, the interest group will not transact.18
For this reason, an argument for a legal presumption in favor of 
lasting legislation at least needs to explain why it is less normatively 
desirable to transfer wealth away from interest groups and toward leg-
islators and lobbyists.  Lasting Legislation frames the issue as an agency 
relationship in which agent-legislators rationally pursuing their own 
interests “exploit the information asymmetries between themselves 
  Lasting 
Legislation contends that lawmakers and lobbyists are able to increase 
aggregate rents and fees with multiple extensions.  This may be true.  
Because interest groups always receive a net gain, however, the ma-
terial difference between multiple extensions and a single enactment 
involves the legislative consumer surplus.  Under temporary legisla-
tion, lawmakers and lobbyists capture a greater portion of that sur-
plus; under lasting legislation, the lion’s share goes to interest groups. 
 
18
 For example, see RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE 88 (reprt. 
1983), which demonstrates the concept of consensual transacting with the example of 
a greengrocer:  “If A sells a tomato to B for $2 . . . we can be sure that the utility to A of 
$2 is greater than the utility of the tomato to him, and vice versa for B.  Likewise, if an 
interest group trades rents and fees for a legislative extension, we can be sure that its 
utility of the extension is greater than its utility of the rents and fees. 
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and voters,”19
Perhaps a counterargument might claim that because legislators 
and lobbyists capture a greater portion of the legislation consumer 
surplus under temporary legislation, temporary legislation raises legis-
lation market barriers and promotes undesirable market concentra-
tion.  The problem with this argument is that it ignores the competi-
tive effects that take place within the supply side.  If, in fact, legislators 
and lobbyists can more easily capture rents and fees, then barriers to 
entry into lawmaking and lobbying are likely to decrease.  Preliminary 
empirical work in this area suggests just that:  younger legislators pre-
fer to legislate temporarily while older legislators prefer to legislate 
permanently.
 and impose traditional agency costs.  It seems to us that 
the proper relationship to consider is between agent legislators and 
principal (nonvoter) interest groups.  The additional layer of voters-
as-principal may be subject to exploitation, but not through the means 
suggested in Lasting Legislation—namely, lawmaker rents and lobbyist 
fees paid by (nonvoter) interest groups.  At best, Lasting Legislation 
finds that temporary legislation is more socially costly because legisla-
tors and lobbyists employ their capital in socially inferior modes than 
do interest groups. 
20
When temporary timing rules are viewed as means for wealth 
transfer, their byproduct informative effects are understood as unam-
biguously welfare-improving.  Early signaling models of lobby activity 
recognize the social value of information transmitted through lobby-
ing.
  One can easily imagine a normative argument in favor 
of empowering a greater number of legislators and potential entrants.  
Competition within their ranks distributes power across the legislature 




 Kysar, supra note 
  Later research goes further, showing that regulatory capture 
can enhance welfare since capture may entail closer relationships be-
tween rent-seekers and interest groups, thereby promoting higher le-
vels of informal interaction that produces hard-to-get and socially val-
1, at 1053. 
20
 See Fagan, supra note 8, at 155-56 (finding that younger legislative sponsors are 
more likely to include temporal restrictions in their legislative proposals). 
21
 See, e.g., Jan Potters & Frans van Winden, Lobbying and Asymmetric Information, 74 
PUB. CHOICE 269, 286 (1992) (observing that “lobbying messages from an interest 
group to a policymaker may be informative even if there is a substantial conflict of in-
terest”); Eric Rasmusen, Lobbying When the Decisionmaker Can Acquire Independent Informa-
tion, 77 PUB. CHOICE 899, 910 (1993) (proposing that “[l]obbying raises welfare when 
the politician’s investigation costs are higher, the politician is more certain of the elec-
torate’s views, and the issue is less important . . . .”). 
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uable information.22
II.  THE IMPORTANCE OF EMPIRICAL RESEARCH 
  Lasting Legislation treats rent-seeking and lobby-
ing activity as a net social cost under any set of conditions.  Instead, we 
should be interested in understanding under what set of conditions a 
temporary timing rule, versus a permanent timing rule, will produce 
benefits from repeated lobbying efforts that outweigh the sum of their 
attendant transactions cost plus any socially costly externalities—
unless of course, there is a strong normative preference for having in-
terest groups realize the legislation consumer surplus. 
Much of the criticism found in Lasting Legislation can be used to 
develop a theoretical model that can serve as the backbone to empiri-
cal study.  For example, based upon the criticisms set forth in Parts III 
and IV (“The Information-Producing and Flexibility Functions of 
Temporary Legislation” and “Disadvantages of Temporary Legisla-
tion”), 23
Using a notation analogous to Gersen and Posner’s, and Luppi 
and Parisi’s,
 we can construct a simple cost-benefit model of temporary 
versus lasting legislation. 
24 Congress enacts a permanent law, revisable with repeal, 
that creates a public benefit Bπ with probability p in exchange for cost 
Cπ and lawmaking cost k with certainty.  Thus, the public’s value of 
their action is pBπ - Cπ - k.
25
The article first argues that the information benefit may not occur 
at all since the legislature may not foresee that “faulty information 
underlies the legislation or whether intervening events will occur that 
would necessitate revised policy—perhaps an unlikely scenario.”
  Congress enacts a temporary law, extend-
able with reenactment, that creates a public benefit Bπ with probability 
p and an information benefit I with probability q in exchange for cost 
Cτ and lawmaking cost k with certainty.  Thus, the public’s value of 
their action is pBτ + qI - Cτ - k.  When Lasting Legislation attacks the in-
formation-producing function of temporary legislation, it essentially ar-
gues that either the probability of receiving the information benefit is 





 Cary Coglianese et al., Seeking Truth for Power:  Informational Strategy and Regulato-
ry Policymaking, 89 MINN. L. REV. 277, 336-41 (2004).   
  In-
23
 Kysar, supra note 1, at 1041-65. 
24
 Gersen & Posner, supra note 10, at 558; Luppi & Parisi, supra note 10, at 22. 
25
 That k is costly to the public might be predicated upon the assumption that 
time is taken away from developing other potentially beneficial legislation. 
26
 Kysar, supra note 1, at 1043. 
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deed, if the legislature believes that correct (i.e., complete) informa-
tion underlies its initial long-term legislative action, it is highly unlike-
ly to legislate temporarily.  However, a policy presumption in favor of 
lasting legislation seems of little value in this scenario.  The legislature 
cannot foresee any error and will presumably legislate permanently 
with or without a presumption. 
Lasting Legislation also finds that probability q of receiving an in-
formation benefit can be sufficiently low because frequent interac-
tions between interest groups and legislators “may lead to a capture 
scenario in which the legislator is acting for the interest group rather 
than a broader constituency, regardless of presented information.”27  
We may further interpret this criticism as an increase in Cτ since a 
portion of the costs associated with those capture benefits may be ex-
ternalized upon the public.  As noted in Lasting Legislation, however, 
frequent interactions can lead to higher, not lower, probabilities of 
beneficial information production for the public,28 which in turn ex-
erts pressure on interest groups to internalize any external Cτ  costs.  
Thus, whether frequent interactions are beneficial is essentially an 
empirical question.  We note, in addition, that from the perspective of 
wealth maximization, the scholarship should consider the benefits of 
all the parties involved—lawmakers, lobbyists, interest groups, and the 
public.  As explained above, Lasting Legislation appears to advance a 
normative position that favors the demand-side of the legislation mar-
ket, especially interest groups. 29
Our preliminary approach to the empirical question of whether 
frequent interactions are socially beneficial has been to divide and iso-
late categories of legislation that might exhibit higher or lower values 
for q.
 
30  For example, temporary legislation that originates from the 
Natural Resources Committee may be subject to meaningful scrutiny 
that produces valuable information for the public more frequently.  In 
contrast, temporary legislation that originates from the Financial Ser-
vices Committee may be subject to meaningful scrutiny that produces 
valuable information for the public less frequently.31
 
27
 Id. at 1044. 
  Further theoret-
28
 See id. (noting that “continuous relationships are a double-edged sword”). 
29
 See supra text accompanying notes 15-16. 
30
 See Fagan, supra note 8, at 124-28 (examining the impact of temporal restric-
tions on passage probability while controlling for legislative committee of origin). 
31
 Gersen provides a case study of the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002, 
which provided a terrorism insurance backstop enacted with a three-year sunset.  Ger-
sen, supra note 11, at 286-98 (citing Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 
107-297, 116 Stat. 2322; Terrorism Risk Insurance Extension Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 
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ical work based upon those hypothetical empirical findings would ad-
dress such a difference, and may lead to empirically grounded norma-
tive recommendations.  For example, it might be that the difference is 
due to Congress’s inability to reward financial services interest groups 
for disclosure.  Thus, in addition to a normative recommendation in 
favor of temporary natural resources legislation, a further recommen-
dation would include the development of a mechanism for rewarding 
disclosure for temporary legislation that originates from the financial 
services committee.32
In addition to arguing that the probability q of receiving an in-
formation benefit can be sufficiently low, such that the value of lasting 
legislation is greater than that of temporary legislation, Lasting Legisla-
tion also argues that the magnitude of any received information bene-
fit I can be sufficiently low.  Temporary legislation might produce 
“over- and underresponsiveness, which spoils the information that the 
legislature considers upon the sunset date.”
 
33  For example, taxpayers 
may structure their transactions in order to garner tax benefits during 
the sunset period, or interest groups may choose not to comply with a 
temporary regulation and simply wait for the temporary regulatory 
environment to end.34  Indeed, interest groups will react to temporary 
and lasting legislation in different ways, but their reaction can only be 
said to produce spoiled or “distorted data”35
 
109-144, 119 Stat. 2660).  At review, the insurance industry revealed little information 
of value for determining if the backstop was necessary, presumably because the value 
of disclosure was insufficient.  Id. at 295-97.  The backstop was extended, albeit with 
higher triggers.  Id. at 297-98. 
 in the sense that a reac-
tion to temporary legislation should, but does not, resemble a reac-
tion to lasting legislation.  We should instead attempt to positively 
identify an interest group’s reaction to each type of timing rule, illu-
minate the “distortions,” and develop sound policy recommendations 
that go beyond a blanket presumption in favor of fostering the undis-
torted data produced by lasting legislation.  This task might prove es-
pecially worthwhile since, as Lasting Legislation notes, temporary and 
lasting legislation each manifest a predilection toward entrench-
32
 Cf. Coglianese et al., supra note 22, at 341 (noting the importance of develop-
ing new methods for rewarding disclosure in opaque policy domains). 
33




 Id. at 1046. 
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ment,36 which can be confusing since interest groups may not react to 
temporary legislation as if it is entrenched.37
Theoretically, we can begin by recognizing temporary and perma-
nent enactments as two types of commitment signals to which the in-
terest group can choose to reveal or not reveal information.  Signaling 
models often posit various states of the world in which the signal is 
sent.  For example, if an interest group receives a temporary enact-
ment signal in a state of the world where the legislature is committed 
to a policy, but its interests are unaligned with those of the interest 
group, a temporary enactment may signal that the legislature hopes to 
gather useful information during the temporary period for future 
lawmaking and is serious about getting the policy right.  The interest 
group would therefore know, from receiving a temporary enactment 
signal in this state of the world, that waiting for the temporary regula-
tory environment to end would be an unsuccessful strategy.  We would 
note that, in this scenario, the planning disruptions that Lasting Legis-
lation argues are brought on by temporary legislation cannot occur.
 
38
With respect to an over-responsive taxpayer who takes advantage 
of a beneficial temporary tax environment, lawmakers might expect 
that a portion of taxpayers will take advantage of the environment and 
adjust their estimates accordingly.  We agree with Professor Kysar that, 
to the extent current budget law permits the non-accounting of ex-
pected behavior, it is flawed.  However, broad policy recommendations 
such as a presumption in favor of lasting legislation that go beyond tax 
policy, for example, should be supported by a thorough body of empir-
ical research.  Not only does research lessen the need to appeal to the 
underlying ideological preferences of lawmakers, it safeguards against a 
blunt overreaction to temporary legislation that may needlessly sacrifice 
welfare-maximizing benefits in other legislative domains. 
  
Again, whether temporary or permanent timing rules signal a com-
mitment are empirical questions, and the answers will likely depend 
on the prevailing political conditions of a particular legal environ-
ment. 
CONCLUSION 
Lasting Legislation presents a needed counterweight to existing 
scholarship that normatively recommends temporary legislation tout 
 
36
 See id. at 1056-63.   
37
 For example, they may be waiting for the legislation to expire. 
38
 See Kysar, supra note 1, at 1063-65. 
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court.  It demonstrates, with a thorough critique, that temporary legis-
lation can quite possibly lead to social welfare loss, and that lawmakers 
should therefore presume to legislate permanently.  Our Response of-
fers two cautions.  First, from the perspective of joint-welfare maximi-
zation, we should examine the utilities of all the parties involved—the 
public, the interest groups, the lawmakers, and the lobbyists.  Lasting 
Legislation focuses on the utilities of the demand side—that is, the 
public and the interest groups.  By doing so, it too readily sees tempo-
rary legislation as more socially costly than lasting legislation.  Instead, 
by taking the utilities of lawmakers and lobbyists into account, the so-
cial costs of temporary legislation are revealed to be portions of the 
legislation consumer surplus.  Moreover, timing rules that allow law-
makers and lobbyists to garner portions of that surplus more easily 
may reduce barriers to lawmaking, thereby promoting normatively de-
sirable effects such as a broader distribution of power throughout the 
legislature and increased legislator turnover. 
Second, because existing theory easily supports conflicting argu-
ments with respect to whether temporary or permanent timing rules 
maximize welfare, we ought to support our normative recommenda-
tions with a thorough body of empirical research.  Questions such as 
whether repeat interactions lead to information revelation, or wheth-
er temporary legislation signals a commitment, cannot be answered 
without making questionable assumptions.39  Professor Kysar makes 
clear that policy presumptions in favor of temporary legislation re-
quire making such assumptions.  However, the answer is not a policy 
presumption in favor of lasting legislation.  While the literature’s ini-
tial approach has been to carve out various legal environments where 
one type of timing rule is likely to enhance welfare more so than the 
other,40
 
 important questions will remain unsettled until we develop a 
thorough body of empirical research. 
 
Preferred Citation:  Frank Fagan & Michael Faure, Response, The Role 
of Lawmakers, Lobbyists, and Scholars in the Normative Evaluation of Timing 
 
39
 Other ripe empirical questions raised in Lasting Legislation include whether 
“cognitive biases . . . bring overreaction . . . [or] underreaction” when citizens rely 
upon an availability heuristic to form their demand function for new risk legislation, see 
Kysar, supra note 1, at 1048, and whether temporary legislation increases or decreases 
general entrenchment levels of legislation, see id. at 1056-63. 
40
 See supra text accompanying notes 11-14. 
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